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Statutes 
in 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to RULE 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a final order of a 
Utah District Court may be appealed. Appellate jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(a) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Should the Trial Court Judge have recused himself from hearing the case due to bias 
on the basis of his ruling in favor of Plaintiff on an issue involving the subject property 
while acting as chair of the Heber City Planning Commission? 
2. Was there was sufficient evidence to support the Trial Court's finding of the scope, 
size dimensions, course, route, and location of a prescriptive easement? 
3. Did the Trial Court properly find the existence of a prescriptive easement? 
4. Did the Trial Court properly apply the clear and convincing standard of proof required 
for a finding of a prescriptive easement? 
5. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to grant the motion for a new trial? 
6. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to grant Plaintiffs motion to amend judgment or 
take additional testimony? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
a. Issue: Whether the Trial Court Judge Should Have Recused Himself from Hearing the 
Case due to bias on the basis of his ruling in favor of Plaintiff on an issue involving the 
subject property while acting as chair of the Heber City Planning Commission. 
Standard of review: Determining whether a trial judge committed error by failing to 
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recuse himself is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness." State v. Tueller, 37 
P.3d 1180, 1183 (Utah App.,2001). See also, Orvis v. Johnson, 146 P.3d 886, 888 (Utah 
App., 2006). 
Grounds for Review: Although the Trial Judge stated that he thought he had been 
involved in a boundary dispute over the Lunt's property while he was the County 
Attorney, it was later determined that Trial Judge's exposure to the property was in his 
role on the Planning Commission and had made specific zoning decisions favorable to 
Lunt's property. No objection was made at trial because the extent of the Trial Judge's 
relationship to the property and Lunt were not known at that time. As soon as Lance 
became aware of the Trial Judge's previous involvement, and before judgment was final, 
Lance moved to disqualify the Trial Judge. (R. 761,783). 
b. Issue: Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the Trial Court's finding of 
the scope, size dimensions, course, route, and location of a prescriptive easement. 
Standard of review: Errors in factual findings, are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Nunlev v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 989 P.2d 1077 (Utah, 1999) (citing 
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1993)). 
Grounds for Seeking Review: The Lances moved for directed verdict of Lunt's claims at 
the close of Lunt's case at trial (R. 958-page 188). The Lances objected to the proposed 
findings, order and judgment regarding the dimensions of easement. (R. 753-754, 960, 
page 3). Furthermore, it was plain error for the Trial Court to rule based on the paucity of 
evidence in the record. 
c. Issue: Whether the Trial Court properly found a prescriptive easement. 
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Standard of review: The finding that an easement exists is a conclusion of law reviewed 
for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998). 
Grounds for Seeking Review: The Lances moved for directed verdict at the close of 
Lunt's case at trial on the basis that the elements for prescriptive easement had not been 
met, specifically that insufficient time of continuous use had passed. (R. 958 page 190-
191). Furthermore, the Trial Court's conclusion was plain error in determining that there 
was an easement. 
d. Issue: Whether the Trial Court properly applied the clear and convincing standard of 
proof. 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court applied the appropriate standard of proof is a 
question reviewed for correctness. Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co., 133 P.3d 382, 386 (Utah, 
2006). In re R.N.J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah Ct.App.1995). 
Grounds for Seeking Review: The Lances moved for new trial on the basis that "the 
evidence in support of the use necessary to establish a prescriptive easement is not clear 
and convincing." (R. 891). Furthermore, it was plain error for the court to determine that 
the evidence met the "clear and convincing" requirement. 
e. Issue: Whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant the motion for a new trial. 
Standard of Review: A denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed pursuant to an abuse 
of discretion standard. Alvev Development Corp. v. Mackelprang, 51 P.3d 45, 47 (Utah 
App., 2002). State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 266 (Utah 1998). 
Grounds for Seeking Review: Lance preserved this issue by moving for new trial. (R. 
761, 847, 961). 
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/ Issue: Whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant Plaintiffs motion to amend 
judgment or take additional testimony. 
Standard of Review: Review of a district court's denial of a 60(b) motion is under an 
abuse of discretion standard of review. Russell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah, 1984). 
Grounds for Seeking Review: Lance preserved this issue by moving for new trial or 
alternatively to take additional testimony. (R. 848, 961). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Canon 3 (b) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves issues regarding the sufficiency of evidence and elements of 
law required to establish a prescriptive easement and whether the particular evidence 
received in the lower court met the clear and convincing standard of proof. This case 
also deals with the impartiality requirements forjudges who have previously had dealings 
with the property, parties, and witnesses before them at trial. Where it was proper to 
assign the case to a new judge following trial, the case should have recognized that Judge 
Pullan should not have heard the matter at all and granted a new trial. 
B. Course of the Proceedings & Disposition of the Case 
1. In 2002, Garth Lunt, Trustee ("Lunt"), brought suit against Harold and 
Diane Lance ("the Lances"), in the Fourth District Court. The Lances also countersued, 
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asserting numerous causes of action. After motions for summary judgment, the parties 
stipulated to the dismissal of all claims with the exception of Lunt's boundary by 
acquiescence and prescriptive easement claims. (R. 621). 
2. A Bench Trial was held on November 1-2, 2005, in Heber City. After trial, 
the Trial Court found that the Lunts had failed to establish a boundary by acquiescence 
but it did find that a prescriptive easement had been established. (R.729-730). 
3. On March 24, 2006, the Lances timely moved to disqualify Judge Pullan 
and for a new trial on the basis of the impartiality caused by his former favorable rulings 
regarding Lunt and his property in his prior service as acting chair of the Heber City 
Planning Commission. During trial, Judge Pullan stated that he was familiar with the 
property having been involved in a "boundary dispute" while formerly serving as County 
Attorney. (R. 958, page 58) No objections were made to his continuing as judge. 
However, after trial, Defendants discovered that Judge Pullan's actual involvement with 
the property was in his previous service as acting chair of the Heber City planning 
commission where he had made certain favorable zoning determinations with regard to 
Lunt's property. Lunt's sister appeared before then Commissioner Pullan and she also 
testified on behalf of Lunt at trial. Judge Pullan's involvement with this witness in both 
arenas called his impartiality into question. On that basis, the Lances moved to disqualify 
Judge Pullan and for new trial (R. 761). The motion was heard by Judge James R. 
Taylor. Judge Taylor ruled "This Court concludes that there may at least be an 
appearance of impropriety should he [Judge Pullan] continue with the case under these 
circumstances" and he ordered that the remainder of the proceedings be heard by Judge 
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Anthony Schofield. (R. 838-840). But, Judge Taylor "declined to set aside the trial or 
ruling of Judge Pullan..." (R. 839). 
4. On May 25, 2006, the Lances timely moved for new trial or in the 
alternative to amend judgment or take additional testimony on the basis of insufficiency 
of the evidence, particularly that the "clear and convincing" standard had not been met. 
This motion was denied by the newly assigned Judge Schofield. 
5. The Court signed the final Judgment establishing the prescriptive easement 
and denying the boundary by acquiescence on December 27, 2006. This is an appeal 
from said Judgment and the orders. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
1. Testimony of Garth Lunt, Trustee of Plaintiff Lunt Trust. According to Garth 
Lunt, trustee of the Plaintiff trust, the width of the easement was either 34 feet, 35 
feet or 10 feet wide. Garth Lunt stated it was approximately 34 feet from wooden 
fence northward toward the Lunt house. (R. 958 at 135). He also stated that there 
were approximately 35 feet between the Lunt House and the northern fence. (R. 
958 at 136). The width of the gate entering into Lunt property from the Lane was 
10 feet. (R. 958 at 186). 
2. Regarding the length of the easement, Garth Lunt testified that it was 274 feet 
from 6 West to the gate entering the Lunt property from the Lane. (R. 958 at 
186. Garth Lunt testified that "someone" moved the gate 62 feet up [eastward] to 
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its current location. (R. 958 at 148). The Lane is 150 feet from 6tn West to the 
gate's present location. (R. 958 at 183). 
3. Regarding the type of historical use, Garth Lunt testified that the Lane was used to 
take cattle and teams of horses up it and hay back to the barn and machinery. (R. 
958 at 134-135). The barn on the Lunt (McNaughten) property was used for milk 
cows and to store hay. (R. 958 at 160). The use of the Lane was not to access the 
back apartment but to access an acre of ground that goes west. (R. 958 at 182-
183). The Lunt property was subdivided such that the house is now on a 1.2 acre 
parcel. (R. 958 at 161). The McNaughton barn was removed in approximately 
1991. (R. 958 at 137). Garth Lunt considered the Lane as mutual property with 
the Lance predecessors, the Witts. (R. 958 at 151). 
4. Testimony of Jack Lunt, brother of Plaintiff trustee: According to Jack Lunt, 
brother of Plaintiff trustee, the Lane was approximately 35 feet wide. (R. 958 at 
42). The 35 foot wide lane terminated about 3-4 feet from the Lunt house. (R. 958 
at 43). The willow tree would be close to the boundary line on the McNaughton 
side. (R. 958 at 53). Originally only a "basement house" was located on the north 
side of the Lane. (R. 958 at 26).The Witts had a shed, cellar and fence on the 
Lane's South boundary. (R. 958 at 31). 
5. Jack Lunt remembered going through a gate that went down through the corral on 
the Lance (formerly Witt) property that he would go through the gate and back 
into the Lunt property. (R. 958 at 30). The gate to the Lunt barn is 10-12 feet 
wide.(R. 958 at 41). 
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6. Regarding the length of the easement, Jack Lunt testified that from 6 West to the 
Witt barn was approximately 240-260 feet. A fence ran along the South side of the 
Lane about 151 feet. (R. 958 at 5). It was between 164-247 feet to the Witt barn 
from 6th West. (R. 958 at 27-28). The Lane terminated about 164 feet deep from 
the 6th West. (R. 958 at 27). It was about 240 feet to the barn from 6th West. (R. 
958 at 28). The wooden fence from the Witt property corner would be about 160-
162 feet (R. 958 at 38). The South side of the Lane is 175 feet back from asphalt 
to the fence. It would have been approximately 62 feet more to the Witt's bam. 
(R. 958 at 41). 
7. Regarding the historical use of the easement, Jack Lunt testified the Lane was used 
for Lunt's predecessors and the Lances predecessors to move equipment, mowing 
machines, delivery rakes from one place to another. (R. 958 at 14). Jack Lunt 
recalled going through the gate in the Lane to feed the calves he had weaned. He 
also took a bob sleigh and a wagon down the lane. (R. 958 at 30). There is no 
longer a gate to get through to go north from the Lane onto the Lunt property -
"Somebody made that a fence." (R. 958 at 44). There was no other use of the 
Lane by Jack Lunt other than to bring hay machinery, milk cows, and a sleigh. (R. 
958 at 51). Jack Lunt saw the Witts (the Lances' predecessors) taking their horses 
down the Lane to the Witts' pasture. 
8. Testimony of Moneves Boren, sister of Plaintiff Trustee. With regard to the width 
of the easement Moneves Boren testified that from the chimney on the apartment 
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over to the wooden fence on the other side of the Lane there was about 35 feet. (R. 
958 at 66). 
9. Regarding the length of the easement, Moneves Boren testified it was about 235 
feet from the edge of the asphalt on 6 West to where the Lane would have gone 
across the barn onto the Lunt property. (R. 958 at 67). 
10. With regard to the historical use, Moneves Boren testified: We used it down— to 
go down through there to park - down the side of the law for we didn't have room 
in the front. Well, and when the snow got deep in there we couldn't get out 
anyway. We used it to park cars. In the summer we used it to take our hay back 
to the barn. We used it to put cattle down in there and take them out to take them 
to the north field, just the general use. (R. 958 at 64). The barn on the Lunt 
property was used only for cattle and to store hay. (R. 958 at 68). In the milk shed 
on the north side of the barn. Moneves Boren Last milked in 1950. (R. 958 at 79). 
Both the Lance predecessors, the Witts and the Lunt predecessors, the 
McNaughtons used the Lane during hay season. (R. 958 at 90). The apartment 
was rented out after 1985. (R. 958 at 91). Tenants could not get to the apartment 
with cars because of the fence put up by Ms. Boren in the 2001. (R. 958 at 109-
110). 
11. Testimony Plaintiff Witness Eldon Carlisle. According to Eldon Carlisle, the 
length of the Lane was about % to 1/3 of a block and where the Lunt predecessors 
would have turned North into the Lunt property. (R. 958 at 118). 
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12. Regarding the use of the easement, Eldon Carlisle testified that both Lunt's 
predecessors and the Lances' predecessors used the Lane. (R. 958 at 117, 121). 
The Witts parked their car on the lane in the 20's and 30's. (R. 958 at 127). The 
McNaughtons (Lunt's predecessors) stopped running cattle in the late 80's or early 
90's. (R. 958 at 128). 
13. According to Defense witness Frankie Housel, length of the measurement from the 
grainery to the Witt Barn was approximately 200 feet. (R. 959 at 267). 
14. Regarding use of the Lane, Frankie Housel testified the Lane was a driveway to 
the Witt's property. (R. 959 at 264). The wood fence was there for the purpose of 
keeping animals and machinery off the Witt's lawn. (R. 959 at 272). 
15. According to defense witness Frank Pia, expert photogrammetrist, from 6th West 
to the Witt barn was approximately 150-175 feet. (R. 959 at 322). 
16. According to Defense witness Duane Smith, the length of the easement was 
approximately 150-200 feet from 6 West to the barn. 
17. Regarding width, Duane Smith testified that the Lane was about 40 feet wide. (R. 
959 at 258). 
18. Regarding use of the easement, Duane Smith testified that only the Witts (Lances' 
predecessors) used the lane. They had machinery parked on both sides of it. (R. 
959 at 255). There's about an eight foot gate in between two big black willow 
trees north of the Lunt house there. Said gate was North of where the house is 
now. (R. 959 at 261). The access way to the garage behind the Lunt house was 
north of the house rather than south across the Lane. (R. 959 at 253). 
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19. According to Diana Lance, The concrete block building on the Lunt property has 
the doors facing north. (R. 959 at 219). 
20. In 1988, Lunt first rented out the apartment (Exhibit 41) usage changed from 
agricultural access to apartment access. (R. 959 at 242). 
21. During trial Judge Pullan stated "when I was the County Attorney for Wasatch 
County I was consulted about a boundary line issue. My recollection is in this 
general area. I have no recollection with whom I talked." (R. 958). Counsel for 
Lances stated "My clients have not been involved with you, they don't recognize 
you. They don't recall anything like that." (R. 958). After the Bench Trial, the 
Lances discovered that Judge Pullan had previously served on the Heber City 
Planning Commission, that he had dealt specifically with the property owned by 
Lunt, and that his previous involvement had been favorable to Lunt. (R. 771, 
766). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The Trial Court erred when it found an all purpose year-round easement because 
the evidence at trial showed only that the Lunt use of the Lane was for occasional 
agricultural purposes over the years and that when the agricultural use had stopped, the 
easement use was abandoned. The court found that the agricultural use was abandoned. 
The use was clearly abandoned in 1991 when the Lunt barn was removed. Lunt did not 
begin to use the Lane for vehicular ingress and egress to the accessory apartment until 
1988. The prescriptive period for such new use has not run. Because the time period for 
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vehicular ingress and egress had not run, the Trial Court should not have found a 
prescriptive easement for a driveway. 
The Trial Court erred when it established the width of the prescriptive easement at 
20 feet wide on the basis that 20 feet was the standard width for a driveway in Heber City 
Municipal Code. The dimensions of a prescriptive easement can only be established by 
historical use. The proper width should be ten to twelve feet wide -which is the width of 
the gate the Lunt's testified as historically leading from the Lane onto the Lunt Property. 
This gate is no longer in existence. The Lane should also only reach a length of at most 
150 feet. All testimony established that the ten-to twelve-foot-wide gate into the Lunt 
Property from the Lane stood between 150 feet West from 600 West street. 
The Trial Court erred when it found that the Lane had been continuously used for 
20 years. Lunt's witnesses had lived on or worked on the property for no more than 
approximately a total of twelve years such that they lacked any basis for testifying of its 
continuing use for more than the requisite 20 years. 
The evidence given did not reach the level of clear and convincing. Lunt's 
witnesses included himself, his brother and his sister -all of whom are interested parties 
and whose testimony was self-serving. They each testified that they had made 
measurements on the property the day before trial, but such measurements were 
irrelevant because they merely measured to where they thought the barn had stood, where 
the gate had been, and where other landmarks used to be. Lunt's only other witness was 
Eldon Carlile. Mr. Carlile testified against the continuous use of the Lane. None of The 
Lances' witnesses were self-interested and testified from memory rather than testifying of 
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contemporary measurements. The Lances' photogramatry expert testified that the use of 
the Lane was not continuous and that other access was used, which tends to show that the 
Lane was abandoned by the Lunt predecessors and used primarily by the Lance 
predecessors. 
Judge Pullan should have been disqualified and a new trial granted. Fourth 
District Presiding Judge Taylor ruled that the facts established "the appearance of 
impartiality" and ordered the remainder of the case to be heard by Judge Schofield. It 
was improper to not order a new trial under the circumstances where there was the 
appearance of impartiality. 
ARGUMENTS 
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT IMPARTIAL AND A NEW TRIAL IS 
WARRANTED. 
After the trial judge issued his Ruling in this case, the Presiding Judge of the 
Fourth District re-assigned the case to another judge in response to Defendants' Motion 
to Disqualify. The basis for the re-assignment was that Judge Pullan, prior to becoming a 
judge, had ruled in favor of Lunt on an issue involving the subject property while acting 
as chair of the Heber City Planning Commission. Further, Lunt's sister testified both at 
the Planning Commission and at trial with regard to the property. (R. 771). 
The evidence in each party's favor in this case was squarely controverted by the 
other side. The decision in the case therefore rested solely in the discretion and 
impressions of the trial judge. It is true that a trial judge typically has wide discretion in 
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deciding disputed issues of fact and the credibility of witnesses. But in this case, not only 
was the trial judge held to the more rigorous standard of clear and convincing evidence, 
he also carried an inherent liability: his ability to rule impartially in the case was subject 
to question due to his prior involvement with Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs property, while on 
the planning commission. 
As detailed in Defendants' Motion to Disqualify, the issue before the planning 
commission was the rezoning of Plaintiff s property, the same property at issue in this 
case. (R. 760-761). The planning commission, chaired by Derek P. Pullan, granted the 
rezoning request and made the boundary of the rezoned area the same boundary that 
separates the rear (or earlier) section of the prescriptive easement granted in this case 
from the front (or later) section of the easement. (R. 766). The rezoning decision 
reserved the rear portion of the property for agricultural use, while granting the front 
portion new residential rights, thereby splitting the zoning map of Heber City along the 
line dividing the old easement from the new easement in this case. (R. 766). Because a 
primary issue in this case was the extent of the rear agricultural use of the property versus 
the front accessory apartment use of the property, the impartiality of the judge, who had 
previously faced similar issues regarding this same property, can reasonably be 
questioned. 
The matter should be retried, not only to ensure that the clear and convincing 
standard is met, but also to guarantee the Lances right to a decision by a factfinder free 
from any preconceptions or involvement with the issues being tried. The Lances made 
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this previous request under Rule 59, Motion for New Trial, and/or Rule 60, Relief from 
Judgment or Order. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED 10 APPLY THE PROPER TEST 10 
DETERMINE THE USE, LOCATION, AND DIMENSIONS OF A PRESCRIPTIVE 
EASEMENT. 
(1). A Prescriptive Easement is Measured and Limited bv its Historic Use. 
"The general rule is that the extent of a prescriptive easement is measured and 
limited by its historic use during the prescriptive period. See McBride v. McBride, 581 
P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978). 'The right cannot be enlarged to place a greater burden or 
servitude on the property." Nielson v. Sandberg, 105 Utah 93, 141 P.2d 696, 701 (1943); 
see also Harvey, 318 P.2d at 349." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah, 
1998). Lunt's evidence shows that until 1987, Lunt's use of the lane was limited to 
occasional agricultural use to bring in cows and agricultural equipment. There is no 
evidence that Lunt made daily use of the lane. Lunt and his predecessors did not use the 
lane to gain vehicular access to a garage, carport or other area to park their vehicles, but 
instead only for moving cattle and farming implements. It was improper for the trial 
court to award Lunt a prescriptive easement for all purposes where Plaintiff never used 
the lane for any purpose other than occasional agricultural use. 
The Easement Cannot be 20 Feet Wide. 
The Trial Court properly found that the agricultural use had been abandoned such 
that the Lane was just an ordinary driveway. Based on its conclusion that the Lane had 
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been abandoned to be an ordinary driveway, the Trial Court established the width of the 
Lane at 20 feet wide based on the standard driveway width in the Heber City code. In 
establishing prescriptive easements, only the historical use of the property is relevant. 
Garth Lunt and Jack Lunt both testified that the historical purpose of the Lane was for 
moving cattle and farming machinery and hay. They also both testified that the gate they 
used to access their property from the Lane was only 10-12 feet wide. A prescriptive 
easement can be no wider than the width of its use. There is no testimony that can show 
that the Lunt's or their predecessors ever used more than 10 to 12 feet to bring machinery 
and hay to their bam across the Lane. The proper width of the easement, if one is indeed 
found to exist, can be no more than 12 feet. 
There was No Evidence Establishing the Length of the Easement. 
The Trial Court properly found that the agricultural use had been abandoned such 
that the Lane did not extend all the way to the location of the bam, which was 
approximately 240 feet from 6th West as testified by Plaintiff witnesses. Plaintiff further 
testified that a new gate had been put up by somebody that was approximately 150 feet 
from 6th West. The Trial Court ruled that the length of the easement would extend only 
to that new gate. This was error. There was no evidence given regarding when the gate 
had been moved or by whom. Unless it can be shown that the gate in its current location 
has been used for the requisite twenty years, it was improper to find the length of the 
easement at any amount. The only proper ruling would have been that the easement was 
entirely abandoned. 
16 
C. The lilements for Prescriptive Easement. Were Not Met 
Use of the lane for daily vehicular traffic is an additional burden beyond the 
historic use of occasional access for agricultural use. "The extent of a prescriptive 
easement is measured and limited by the historic use of the dominant estate owner during 
the prescriptive period. McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978). The trial 
court, in requiring Appellee to keep his gates closed, limited Appellee's use of the 
easement based on equity and not on Appellee's historical use of the easement. To this 
extent the trial court's ruling was improper as a matter of law." Kunzler v. O'DelL 855 
P.2d 270, 275(Utah App.,1993). "while the owner of the dominant estate may enjoy to 
the fullest extent the rights conferred by his easement, he may not alter its character so as 
to further burden or increase the restriction upon the servient estate." Mcbride v. 
Mcbride, at 997. Daily vehicular traffic is clearly a different character of use of the Lane 
than the occasional driving of cattle and farm equipment. In Mcbride, the trial court 
concluded and the Supreme Court confirmed, that merely placing locks on pre-existing 
gates over a prescriptive easement was "clearly an interference with the privilege to 
which the owners of the easement were entitled since it made their use less convenient 
and beneficial than before" McBride at 998. "It is essential that the use should relate 
strictly to the identical way over which the right is claimed. A way imports a right of 
passing in a particular line, and not everywhere, over the land upon which the right may 
be claimed. This does not mean that a person using the right of way may not deviate at all 
from the traveled rut or track, to the extent, at least, that this may become necessary in a 
reasonable use of the right of way; but it does mean that the claimant may not abandon 
17 
one track or right of way and adopt another. In Kurtz v. Hoke, 172 Pa. 165, 33 Atl. 549, it 
is held that a variation of 20 feet from the traveled road is fatal to continuity of use." 
Lund v. Wilcox, 34 Utah 205, 97 P. 33, 35 (Utah 1908). At trial, testimony was given by 
Duane Smith, that there was no use of the Lane by Lunt's predecessors for the 2-3 year 
period of time during which he worked for Lunt's predecessors and the access he used to 
the property was on the North side of the Lunt property, no the South where the Lane is. 
(R. 259 at 249-250). Frank Pia, the photogrametry expert, further testified that based on 
the aerial photographs of the Lane and the Lunt property show the increasing use of the 
North side of the Lunt property to access the barn in the back. R. 259 at 308). The 
agricultural use of the Lane had been abandoned. 
The Lunt predecessors built a cinder block building on the property in 
approximately 1950 (R. 958 at 87-88). The doors to that building opened to the North. 
(R. 959 at 219 and Trial Exhibit No. 17). If Lunt was coming into the property on a 
regular basis from the South across the Lane, it would make no sense to put the doors to 
the building on the North side of the Building. 
Any "prescriptive right would be limited by the nature and extent of use during the 
prescriptive period. Richardson v. Pond, 15 Gray, Mass., 387, Jones on Easements, Sec. 
292. "A right of way for one purpose gained by user cannot be turned into a right of way 
for another purpose if the latter adds materially to the burden of the servient estate; and 
the right derived from user can never outrun or exceed the user in which it had its origin." 
American Bank-Note Co. v. New York El. R. Co., 129 N.Y. 252, 29 N.E. 302, 305; Ryan 
v. Mississippi Valley S. I. R. Co., 62 Miss. 162; Richardson v. Pond, supra; Jones on 
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Easements, Sec. 291. The use during the prescriptive period is the only indication of the 
nature and extent of the right acquired. Turner v. Hart, 71 Mich. 128, 38 N.W. 890, 15 
Am.St.Rep. 243. The servient estate can only be subjected to the easement to the extent 
to which the easement was acquired, and the easement owner cannot change this use so 
as to put any greater burden upon the servient estate." Nielson v. Sandberg, 105 Utah 93, 
141 P.2d 696, 701 (Utah 1943). If Lunt had acquired an easement, it was only for the 
occasional use of the Lane for cattle and movement of farm equipment into the barn that 
used to stand on the property. The only historical use testified to by Lunt and the Lunt 
witnesses was for the occasional movement of cattle and farming equipment. Moneves 
Boren presented conflicting testimony, she indicated that she parked cars on the Lane but 
then said that she couldn't get cars back there, then she indicated that a fence precluded 
the tenants' from placing cars on the Lane. (R. 958 at 64, 109-110). Only after 1988, 
when Lunt rented out the accessory apartment, did the Lane begin being used as a 
driveway to access the accessory apartment. The 20 year time period for use of the Lane 
as a driveway has not run and the Trial Court's finding of a prescriptive easement should 
be reversed. 
D. THE EVIDENCE OF ACQUISITION OF A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT IS 
NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING. 
In order to acquire a prescriptive easement against Defendants, Plaintiff must have 
used the land in question in an open and continuous manner for a period of twenty years. 
Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 1998). The evidence presented to satisfy 
these elements must be clear and convincing. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 682 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1989). "[I]t is the duty of the appellate court in reviewing the evidence to 
determine, not whether the trier of facts could reasonably conclude that it is more 
probably that the fact to be proved exists than that it does not, ... but whether the trier of 
facts could reasonably conclude that it is highly probable that the fact exists. " State ex 
rel. Z.D., 98 P.3d 40 (Utah App. 2004), citing Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 
286 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah 1955). An appellate court does not give factual 
determinations made by a trial judge the same amount of deference ... an appellate court 
does not, as a matter of course resolve all conflicts in favor of the appellee." Alta Indus, 
v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1993). Emphasis in original. The Trial Court' 
factual conclusions, are therefore open for review. 
(1). The Testimony of Plaintiff s Witnesses that Plaintiff Used Defendants' Land 
Was Not Clear and Convincing. 
Plaintiff called four witnesses to testify in support of Plaintiff s claim that Plaintiff 
used Defendants' land to access Plaintiffs property. Three of these witnesses were 
effectively parties with the Plaintiff, inasmuch as they were the trustee and the brother 
and sister of the trustee of the Plaintiff trust. These three witnesses therefore were self-
interested and their testimony self-serving. Furthermore, the knowledge of these three 
witnesses concerning use of Defendants' land was extremely limited, because they never 
lived, or else very briefly lived, at the location in question. Moreover, the only 
disinterested witness called by Plaintiff, Eldon Carlisle, acknowledged that an alternate 
route other than the alleged easement was used to access Plaintiffs property. 
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Jack Lunt, brother of Garth Lunt, trustee of the Plaintiff trust, initially testified that 
the lane was used continuously by Plaintiff from 1951 to the present. (R. 958 at 43, 46-
47). On cross-examination, however, Jack Lunt admitted that the only time he lived at 
the property was for one year in 1951. (R. 958 at 48; see also page at 13). After 1951, 
Jack Lunt lived in Nevada for four years, California for four years, and Bingham, Utah 
for three years. (R958 at 48). The Court's finding that "Garth Lunt joined his brother" 
Jack at the home in 1954 therefore is not supported by the evidence. Jack Lunt also 
testified that Plaintiffs cattle permit was sold in the 1960s (R. 958 at 13), and that the 
lane was never used by Plaintiff for cattle purposes after the cattle permit was sold. (R. 
958 at 43). Finally, Jack Lunt testified that he did not know about the uses of the 
property prior to 1951. (R. 958 at 13-14). Thus, even though Jack Lunt testified that the 
lane was used for many decades by Plaintiff, the actual details of his testimony are not 
clear and convincing in this regard. Jack Lunt testified that he saw the Lane but he does 
not testify that he continued to use the Lane. 
Plaintiffs next witness was Moneves Boren. Ms. Boren lived at the property for 
only two years, in 1948 and 1949. (R. 958 at 60). Ms. Boren, like Jack Lunt, testified in 
general terms that the lane was used continuously by Plaintiff from 1948 to the present. 
(R. 958 at 64). On closer examination, however, this assertion is not well-supported by 
the details of the testimony of Ms. Boren and others. Ms. Boren testified that she did not 
work on the farm at the property in question. (R. 958 at 61). She did testify that she 
helped milk the cows (R. 958 at 61), but she also testified that she did not use the lane in 
the milking of the cows. (R. 958 at 90). Furthermore, Ms. Boren testified in her 
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deposition that at some point she used the northerly entrance on 600 West to access the 
property instead of the lane, a fact which is corroborated by Exhibit 43, an aerial 
photograph showing a road entering the property north of the McNaughten house. See 
Trial Exhibit 43. Finally, although Ms. Boren testified that the McNaughtens parked cars 
on the lane when the house was first constructed in 1948 (R. 958 at 64), she testified in 
that when the house was first constructed, there was no garage and the apartment wasn't 
built until approximately 1985. (R. 958 at 63, 91). Without the garage and apartment 
next to the property line, the parked cars would not have been occupying the lane, but 
instead would have been parked on the McNaughten's own property. For all of these 
reasons, Ms. Boren's testimony as to the required open, adverse and continuous use of 
the lane was not clear and convincing. 
Plaintiffs third witness was Eldon Carlisle. Mr. Carlisle was Plaintiffs only 
witness who was not a relative of the trustee of the Lunt trust. Mr. Carlisle testified that 
the Lunt's predecessors (his parents) used the lane (R. 958 at 117-118), but he also 
testified that there was a separate gate on the Lunt property that cows may have been 
brought through as well. (R. 958 at 124-125). Most importantly, Mr. Carlisle's 
testimony was directly contradicted by two disinterested witnesses of Defendant, Duane 
Smith and Frankie Housel. For these reasons, Mr. Carlisle's testimony as to the existence 
of the easement was not clear and convincing. 
Plaintiffs final witness was Garth Lunt, trustee and beneficiary of the Plaintiff 
trust. Garth Lunt testified that the only time he lived at the house was to help out during 
the summers of 1945 to 1950 with haying. (R. 958 at 133). Beginning in 1950, he was 
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away in the military. (R. 958 at 137). From 1954, when he returned from the service, 
until 1957, he lived in Salt Lake and would visit the property periodically. In 1957, he 
moved to California where he has lived to this day. (R. 958 at 137). 
The above-described testimony offered by Plaintiff does not rise to the level of 
clear and convincing evidence sufficient to establish a prescriptive easement. All of 
Plaintiffs witnesses except Eldon Carlisle were interested witnesses. None of the 
witnesses lived at the property for more than two years out of the more than 60 years in 
question. The witnesses admitted that another more central access to the property 
existed. None of the witnesses had credible firsthand knowledge of the alleged 
continuous twenty-year use of the lane by the McNaughtens. Further, Garth Lunt (R. 958 
at 135, 139, 170, 184), Jack Lunt (R. 958 at 28, 31, 40), and Moneves Boren (R. 958 at 
64, 65, 67) had each visited the property on the day before trial for the purpose of making 
measurements. They each testified to the length of the Lane based on where they 
remembered the location of a gate to be. The gate is no longer there, but according to 
Garth Lunt was "moved up" by "somebody." (R. 958 at 148). All testimony with regard 
to measurements is unreliable, having not been based on historical use. Further, there 
was no agreement with regard to when the Lunt barn was built, Jack Lunt testified that he 
helped build it, after he returned from the service in 1951. Moneves Boren testified that 
she milked cows in it in 1948 and 1949. Frankie Housel testified that there was no barn 
in 1957. Plaintiffs' testimony is conflicting on key issues, not clear and convincing. 
23 
(2). The Lances5 Witnesses Presented Controverting and Expert Testimony Which 
Prevents Plaintiffs Evidence from Meeting the Clear and Convincing Standard, 
Where fact testimony and expert testimony conflict, it is probable that the clear 
and convincing standard has not been met. For example, in State ex rel Z.D., this Court 
stated "Because the explanations as to the cause of the injury provided by the parents 
[was] inconsistent with the medical testimony ... we cannot say that given the evidence 
presented, the trier of facts could reasonably conclude that it [was] highly probable that 
the fracture was the result of non accidental trauma." 98 P.3d 40, 46 (Utah App. 2004). 
Similar to the present case, Defendants introduced numerous aerial photographs showing 
that the McNaughtens and their heirs accessed their property from 600 West a few 
hundred feet north of the lane. Frank Pia, an expert photogrammatrist, testified that this 
northerly access was well-used and worn. (R. 959 at 299-308). The fact that Lunt's 
predecessor accessed the rear of the property from a separate way shows that the area of 
the prescriptive easement was no longer in use. 
Defendants' witnesses were at least as credible as Plaintiffs witnesses, and 
arguably more so. At the very least, the disputed questions of fact raised by the 
testimony of Defendants' witnesses precludes Plaintiffs case from rising to the level of 
clear and convincing evidence. 
Duane Smith testified that he has lived in Heber City all his life. (R. 959 at 247). 
He worked for the McNaughtens (the Lunt predecessors) in the 1930s and 1940s and 
would take cows and horses back and forth from the subject property for them. (R. 959 
at 248, 255). He testified that he never used the lane for moving livestock. (R. 959 at 
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248). Instead, he used a gate on 600 West located north of the location of the 
McNaughten house to take the cows and horses to and from the property. (R. 959 at 251-
252). He never saw the McNaughtens run livestock or drive machinery on the Lane. (R. 
959 at 250, 255). This is a direct contradiction to the testimony of the Lunt family 
members during the time period in question. 
Frankie Housel is a granddaughter of Frank Witt (the Lances' predecessor in 
interest), who owned the property south of the McNaughtens (Lunt's predecessor). (R. 
959 at 263-264). She stayed with her grandparents at the property every weekend from 
1945 to 1957. (R. 959 at 264). She testified that she never saw the McNaughtens drive 
cattle or equipment on the lane. (R. 959 at 269). She also testified that she used the lane 
to walk to go swimming and that there was no gate anywhere on the fence between the 
Witt and McNaughten properties that exited to the north to the McNaughten property. 
(R. 959 at 278). This is a direct contradiction to the testimony of 
Finally, the trial judge cited Eldon Carlisle's testimony as particularly credible. 
See Ruling (R. 843-846). Mr. Carlisle's testimony, however, raises numerous 
unanswered questions. Mr. Carlisle testified that in 1930 through 1950, a fence bordered 
the lane approximately three or four feet from the Lunt house. (R. 959 at 121). But 
testimony by Moneves Boren established that when the house was constructed in 1948, 
the garage or carport was not in existence. (R. 958 at 91). If the fence adjoining the lane 
used by the McNaughtons was only three or four feet from the house, then the land used 
as the lane was not the easement area in question, but instead was the McNaughtons' own 
driveway on their own property. This most likely was the reason Frankie Witt Housel 
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testified, in contradiction to Mr. Carlisle, that she never saw the McNaughtons use her 
Grandfather Witt's lane. The McNaughtons, then, were most probably using land on 
their own property for their access. 
In a traditional preponderance-of-the-evidence case, the trial judge may have had 
the discretion to side with Plaintiffs witnesses rather than Defendants' witnesses on the 
above-described evidentiary record. In a case such as this requiring clear and convincing 
evidence, however, the weaknesses of Plaintiff s evidence, especially when combined 
with the controverting testimony of Defendant's witnesses, preclude a finding that 
Plaintiff proved the existence of a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
E. GIVEN THE CLOSENESS OF THIS CASE, THE TRIAL JUDGE'S DECISION 
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF WHILE CHAIRING THE HEBER CITY PLANNING 
COMMISSION WARRANTS ANEW TRIAL. 
In State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah), cert, denied. 487 U.S. 1220, 108 S.Ct. 2876, 
101 L.Ed.2d 911 (1988), "the Utah Supreme Court set out the standard for whether a trial 
judge's failure to recuse himself or herself constitutes reversible error. In Neeley, the 
court stated that, under the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, ' a judge should recuse himself 
when his 'impartiality' might reasonably be questioned." Id. at 1094. A judge shall enter 
a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, including but not limited to instances where the judge has personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. Utah Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1). "Scholars discussing this principle have described it as 
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the "reasonable person" test. This test 4look[s] to see whether a reasonable person, 
knowing all the circumstances, would believe that the judge's impartiality could be 
questioned." West Jordan City v. Goodman, 135 P.3d 874, 880 (Utah,2006). "[A] trial 
judge's failure to recuse based on the appearance of bias may be grounds for reversal if 
actual prejudice is shown." State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah,1998). citing State 
v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1837, 
108 L.Ed.2d 965 (1990). "Actual prejudice can be shown when there exists a reasonable 
likelihood that the result would have been more favorable for the defendants absent the 
trial judge's appearance of bias." Id. 
There is a reasonable likelihood that absent Judge Pullan's bias, the result would have 
been very different for the Lances. The nature of this litigation and the nature of the 
approval granted by the Planning Commission on which Judge Pullan sat in 1998, both 
dealt with similar issues involving the use of the Lunt property. 
First, the property that was rezoned by the Planning Commission chaired by Judge 
Pullan in 1998 is the same property that is at issue in the current litigation before this 
court. (R. 762-773) Heber City Zoning Map showing front portion of the property in the 
R-2 Zone and rear portion of the property in the RA-2 Zone)). 
Second, the property was owned in 1998 by the same party who owned it at the time 
of trial, Garth Lunt. R. 958 atl31). Therefore, the landowner/applicant in whose favor 
the 1998 Planning Commission ruled is the same landowner/applicant who is now asking 
this court to grant an easement to access the rear of the subject property. 
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Third, Garth Lunt, the property owner, and Moneves Boren, the agent who appeared 
on behalf of Mr. Lunt at the Planning Commission meetings chaired by Judge Pullan, 
were the primary witnesses relied upon by Plaintiff at trial in this case. Furthermore, Ms. 
Boren is the sister of Mr. Lunt. (R. 958 at 60, 131). 
Fourth, the Planning Commission ruled in Mr. Lunt's and Ms. Boren's favor. (R. 
766, Planning Commission Minutes, September 24, 1998). 
Each of the above facts calls into question the bias of Judge Pullan to rule in favor of 
Lunt in the instant case. Judge Pullan chaired the Planning Commission when the 
Planning Commission granted a favorable ruling to the identical parties involved in this 
case on a matter concerning the identical property involved in this case. 
Fifth, Ms. Boren explained to the Planning Commission that she was seeking the zone 
change for only the front portion of the property so that she could continue using the rear 
portion of the property for agricultural purposes. (R. 771-772, Planning Commission 
Minutes, August 27, 1998). The use of the rear portion of the property for agricultural 
purposes, and the actual dates of that use, were two of the most hotly-contested issues at 
trial. Furthermore, the approximately 160-foot distance to the gate on the property, 
which gate was allegedly used by Plaintiff to access the rear portion for agricultural 
purposes and which distance was specifically mentioned by Ms. Boren at the Planning 
Commission meeting, is approximately the same distance which Judge Pullan used in his 
ruling to delineate the prescriptive easement, and is an issue still in dispute in this appeal 
to define the length of the easement. Judge Pullan therefore had "personal knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding" and therefore his "impartiality 
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might reasonably be questioned." Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1). Judge 
Taylor agreed that the Lances had established "the appearance of partiality" and ordered 
Judge Schofield to hear the remaining issues. (R. 839, 842). 
If it was necessary to appoint a separate judge for the remaining issues, it should be 
necessary to appoint a new judge for a new trial because under the circumstances it is 
reasonably likely that the result would have been more favorable to the Lances if the trial 
judge would have had no previous experience with the parties and property. 
Sixth, Judge Pullan indicated to the parties at trial that he believed he may have had 
some prior involvement with this matter as Wasatch County Attorney prior to taking the 
bench. (R. 958 at 58). After consultation, the parties, including Defendants, then waived 
any objection. (R. 958 at 59). Judge Pullan failed, however, to indicate the full or correct 
nature of his prior involvement with the matter, namely, his service on the Planning 
Commission before which Ms. Boren appeared. If Defendants had known of this 
particular involvement by Judge Pullan, they would have asked him at that time to 
disqualify himself. (R.792-795 Affidavit of Diana Lance). 
In summary, the facts that (1) these parties and this property appeared before the 
Planning Commission on which Judge Pullan sat and received a favorable ruling, and (2) 
the zone change request before the Planning Commission contained evidence of facts at 
issue in the instant trial, taken separately or together, warrant a finding that Judge 
Pullan's impartiality in this matter was reasonably be questioned under Canon 3. Judge 
Taylor agreed that it was reasonable to question Judge Pullan's impartiality. However, it 
should have been ordered at that time to grant a new trial on the basis of said impartiality 
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and the actual bias experienced by the Lances. The overlap between the zoning issues 
before Judge Pullan and the litigation is poignant: Lunt stated, for zoning purposes that 
the Lane ran 150 feet from the road to a gate. At trial, Judge Pullan ruled that the 
easement was 150 feet long, based on the location of the alleged gate. There was no 
testimony given regarding when this new gate was established or how long it had been 
used. In establishing the width of the easement, Judge Pullan used 20 feet based on 
Heber City zoning code for the standard width of a driveway rather than the actual 
historic use of the Lane. Based on this showing of bias, the findings should be reversed 
and a new trial granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment is inconsistent with the current case law regarding the establishment 
of a prescriptive easement. The scope and dimensions of the easement found by the Trial 
Court were erroneous. The evidence before the Trial Court regarding the establishment 
of a prescriptive easement was not clear and convincing. 
WHEREFORE, Harold and Diana Lance pray that this Court reverse the judgment 
and order of the Trial Court herein and find that a prescriptive easement was not 
established over the Lances' property, or otherwise remand this for new trial or further 
proceedings before a new judge consistent with Utah Law. 
DATED this \1} th day of June, 2007. 
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
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Shawn W.'Potter 
Attorneys for the Lances 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of the 
Appellants Harold and Diane Lance, to be sent by United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
on this _ day of June, 2007, as follows: 
Randy B. Birch 
BOSTWICK & PRICE 
139 East South Temple # 320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Garth Lunt? : 
Petitioner : Ruling 
vs. : Date: May 3,2006 
Harold Lance, : Case Number: 020500612 
Respondent : Presiding Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court, sitting as a "reviewing judge" by certification from 
the Honorable Derek Pullan as required by Rule 63(b)(2) following the receipt of an "Affidavit 
for Rule 63 Removal of Judge" filed by the Petitioner. 
Rule 63(b)(3)(A) requires this Court to determine if the motion and affidavit are timely 
filed, filed in good faith and legally sufficient. Each requirement will be discussed. 
Rule 63(b)(1)(A) states: 
"A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to 
disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a 
certificate that the motion is filed in good faith and shall be 
supported by an affidavit stating facts sufficient to show bias, 
prejudice or conflict of interest." 
Rule 63(b)(1) (B) states further that the motion must be filed not later than 20 days after 
the moving party discovered the grounds for the motion. 
This case was tried before Judge Pullan on November 1-2, 2005. Judge Pullan entered a 
Ruling on November 23, 2005. Oral argument on objections to a proposed order from that ruling 
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was heard on February 16, 2006. In the middle of the first day of trial, November 1, 2005, Judge 
Pullan noted, on the record, that "[i]n chambers I indicated that when I was the County Attorney 
for Wasatch County, I was consulted about the boundary line issue. My recollection is in this 
general area. I have no recollection with whom I talked." The parties made an affirmative 
determination at that time that they had no concerns about a possible conflict of interest. The 
Judge's ruling was that although the Plaintiff had failed to establish a boundary by acquiescence 
the claim for a prescriptive easement had been established, in part. The Plaintiff was ordered to 
obtain and pay the costs of a survey to identify the prescriptive easement. After oral argument on 
February 16, 2006 the Court stated, further, that the easement was to be 20 feet in width and 
measured from the center line of the street, east to 600 West. In early March, 2006, while doing 
research to prepare the required easement on of the Defendants discovered that when Judge 
Pullan was the Wasatch County Attorney in 1998 the property considered in this case was before 
the Heber City Planning Commission for a requested zone change. Judge Pullan was the acting 
chair of the commission when the commission recommended a zone change as requested by 
Moneves Boren. Ms. Boren subsequently testified in the trial of this case. 
This Court has carefully reviewed Judge Pullan's Ruling. He necessarily made extensive 
findings of fact about the historic use and condition of the property from the late 1920's through 
the present. The past, present or future zoning classification of the area was not considered or 
relevant to his conclusion that from the 1930's through at least the mid-1970's there was open, 
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notorious, continuous and adverse use of the subject lane for more than 20 years to establish a 
prescriptive right in favor of the Plaintiff. 
The first question raised by this motion is whether the requisite 20 day period began with 
Judge Pullan's disclosure during the first day of trial or whether the period should begin when 
Ms. Lance discovered that Judge Pullan served as acting chair of the Planning Commission when 
a request to re-zone the property7 was recommended in 1998. The focus of the Defendant's 
complaint is not upon the substance of Judge Pullan's ruling but questions whether there is an 
appearance of impropriety because he was called upon to impartially consider the testimony of 
Ms. Boren, the applicant in the zone change and a witness during this trial. There is no 
suggestion that Judge Pullan was other than candid and forthright when he declared at the time of 
the trial that he had no recollection of any other involvement with the property. The zoning 
hearing preceded the trial by more than seven years. Nevertheless, because the question relates 
to the common participation of Ms. Boren in both instances it is reasonable that the 20 day period 
commence from when it was discovered that Judge Pullan wras involved in both proceedings. 
This motion was filed on March 24, 2006 just nine days after Ms. Lance received the 
documentation from Heber City that indicated Judge Pullan's participation. The motion is, 
therefore, timely. 
This motion is accompanied by the affidavit of Diana Lance. In paragraph 13 she states 
"I am filing the accompanying Motion to Disqualify based on a good-faith belief that the judge's 
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impartiality in this matter can reasonably be questioned." The Court will accept this portion of 
the affidavit as the requisite certification under the rule. 
The unusual dilemma presented by this motion is that it does not seek to merely conclude 
the prospective involvement of Judge Pullan, the moving party seeks a determination that a trail 
already concluded was tainted and should be set aside. No specific references to the trial, written 
ruling or subsequent proceedings have been made to demonstrate actual bias or prejudice. Rule 
63 addresses the prospective involvement of a judge and is not intended to determine 
proceedings already concluded. Questions about a trial already conducted and a ruling already 
rendered must be determined by either the appellate process or through Rule 60, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The moving party addresses only the appearance of impropriety. The available record is 
that Judge Pullan had no recollection of the previous proceeding involving the same witness. 
Nevertheless, this motion would, at the least, remind him of those proceedings. This Court 
concludes that there may at least be an appearance of impropriety should he continue with the 
case under these circumstances. 
Accordingly, while this Court declines to set aside the trial or ruling of Judge Pullan, this 
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matter will be reassigned to Judge Anthony W. Schofield for such other proceedings as shall be 
appropriate. 
Copies of this Order mailed to: 
Counsel for the Plaintiff: 
Randy B. Birch 
139 E. South Temple, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for the Defendants: 
Kraig J. Powell 
2 South Main Street, Suite 2-D 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
Mailed this _day of 
Dated this 3rd 
Judge James R: 
Fourth/Judicial 
/ 
/ L ^ / ; 2006, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
V_ 
Y^Qgs 
Courfclerk / N 
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EXHIBIT B 
Randy B. Birch #04197 
BOSTWICK& PRICE, P.C. 
One Thirty Nine East 
South Temple St., Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-961-7400 
Facsimile- 801-961-7406 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Garth Lunt, Trustee of the Garth O. Lunt Revocable Trust 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARTH LUNT, trustee of the GARTH 
O. LUNT REVOCABLE TRUST, 
FINDINGS, 
Plaintiff, ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
vs. 
HAROLD LANCE, and DIANE LANCE Civil No. 020500612 
and Does 1-10, 
Judge: DEREK P. PULLAN 
Defendants. 
The above captioned matter came before the court for trial on November 1, and 2, 
2005. Tlie Plaintiff was present by and through its trustee Garth Lunt and represented by its 
attorneys of record, BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C., the Defendants were present and represented 
by Chris Greenwood. The Court having previously made it findings and conclusions in its 
Memorandum Decision dated November 23,2005, the same are incorporated herein. 
Based thereon, the Court orders as follows: 
1. A prescriptive easement for a driveway is confirmed in the Plaintiff which 
easement is twenty (20) feet wide and One Hundred and approximately eighty three (183) feet 
long. Tlie same extending from the center of 600 West street in Hcber in a westerly direction 
along the south side of a home located at 205 N. 600 West, Hcber City, Utah, and going 
approximately 183 feet to the current location of the fence which was formerly a gate and 
which runs north and south at approximately 183 feet west of the center of 600 West street in 
Heber City, Utah. The easement is more particularly described as follows: 
See the attached Exhibit "A". 
2. A certified copy of this Order shall be recorded with the Wasatch County 
Recorder's office. 
3. The Plaintiffs claims of boundary by acquiescence are dismissed. 
4. Whereas this is an easement that is confirmed in the Plaintiff, Plaintiff is 
entitled to use the easement as any party would normally use a driveway. Defendants shall 
not block access to the easement and shall remove forthwith any materials blocking or 
obstructing the easement. 
5. Plaintiff shall pay the costs of preparing a legal description as necessitated by 
the Court's ruling. 
6> Each party to pay their own attorney's fees. 
7. Plaintiff is awarded costs against the Defendant in the amount of $2,332,20, 
DATED this If day of M^f 2006, 
•ftkP Pii l lhnZ. i Derek P. Pullta 
District Court Judge 
KraigJ. Powell 
Attorney for Defendants 
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I hereby certify than on April 26, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document to be 
[ X ] mailed postage prepaid 
[ ]• faxed to No-
[ ] hand delivered 
to: 
KraigJ. Powell 
TESCH LAW OFFICES 
2 South Main Street, Suite 2-D 
Heber City, UT 84032 
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EXHIBIT C 
TE3CH LAW OFFICES RC, 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARTH LUNT, Trustee of the GARTH 0. 
LUNT REVOCABLE TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAROLD LANCE and DIANA LANCE, 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 020500612 
DATED: NOVEMBER 15, 2006 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This matter comes before the court on defendants' motion for new trial, or in the 
alternative to amend the judgment and/or take additional testimony. I have carefully read all 
motions and memoranda and have considered the oral arguments presented in this matter. I now 
deny defendants' motion. 
RULING 
1. Defendants Do Not Warrant a New Trial Under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "both the granting of, and the refusing to grant, a 
new trial is a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge . . . ." Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988). However, before a court may exercise its discretion in granting a new 
trial, the moving party must present "a showing of one of the grounds specified in Rule 59 of the 
1 
FILEP 
NOV 1 5 2006 
4TH D!S1 tiiV I 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUMTY 
VJAWTC H 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Tangaro v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 292 n.2 (Utah 1962). 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides generally that a trial judge may grant a 
new trial for any of the following causes: (1) irregularity in the proceedings of the court; (2) 
misconduct of the jury; (3) accident or surprise; (4) newly discovered evidence; (5) excessive or 
inadequate damages; (6) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict; or (7) error in law. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(a). While defendants have not specifically stated the grounds under Rule 
59(a) for which they seek a new trial, it appears from their arguments that they believe the 
evidence provided in the original trial was insufficient to justify the verdict. 
There is no question that it is the responsibility of the trial judge to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses and the facts provided by them. State ex rel B. G., 2006 UT App 227 
(2006); see also State v. Robins, 142 P.3d 589, 593 (citing People v. Maybeny, 542 P.2d 1337, 
1342 (Cal. 1975) ("[I]t is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the 
credibility of a witness.")). Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the finding of 
whether an easement exists is "the type of highly fact-dependent question, with numerous 
potential fact patterns, which accords the trial judge a broad measure of discretion when applying 
the correct legal standard to the given set of facts." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 
1998). Though defendants claim that the testimony of plaintiff s witnesses is insufficient to 
satisfy the "clear and convincing" evidence standard necessary to grant a prescriptive easement, 
Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), Judge Pullan was in the best 
position to make that determination. 
In Judge Pullan's November 28, 2005, ruling (hereinafter the "ruling"), he acknowledges 
that the testimony of defendants' witnesses was directly contradicted by testimony from 
plaintiffs witnesses. Ruling, pp. 3-10. Said differently, Judge Pullan was not able to hannonize 
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the testimony of the various witnesses of the parties. However, after weighing the evidence and 
credibility of the witnesses, Judge Pullan concluded that plaintiff had successfully proven the 
elements of a prescriptive easement by "clear and convincing evidence." Ruling, p. 12. 
Referring to one of plaintiff s witnesses, Judge Pullan noted that "the testimony of Mr. Eldon 
Carlisle . . . was particularly credible." Ruling, p. 13. However, referring to the testimony of one 
of defendants' witnesses, Judge Pullan stated, "the weight of the evidence demonstrates clearly 
and convincingly otherwise." Ruling, p. 12. 
That contradictory evidence was presented throughout the trial does not mean that the 
evidence in favor of granting the prescriptive easement was not clear and convincing. Every trial 
contains contradictory evidence. That is the nature of the adversarial legal system. It is the 
primary responsibility of the trial judge to weigh and judge the credibility of competing witness 
testimony and to make decisions thereon. Defendants' "sincere and compelling belief that the 
trial judge made an incorrect ruling does not warrant a new trial. 
Defendants' second challenge is that Judge Pullan's involvement with the Heber City
 t 
Planning Commission with respect to this property warrants a new trial. Though neither party 
addressed Judge Pullan's involvement with the Heber City Planning Commission in great detail 
in their memoranda, it appears from oral argument that his involvement as a member of the 
planning commission did not create a bias or prejudice which justifies a new trial in this matter. 
As Chainnan of the planning commission, Judge Pullan was one of several members of that body 
who dealt with the issue of plaintiff s property. He did not act alone. Additionally, at the 
beginning of the trial Judge Pullan remembered his previous involvement with plaintiffs 
property and asked the parties if they objected to his trying the case. At that time, neither party 
objected. Having failed to object at that time, when the issue was squarely addressed to the 
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parties by Judge Pullan, plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain. Judge Pullan's previous 
involvement with plaintiffs property does not warrant a new trial. 
2. Defendants Are Not Entitled To Be Relieved From or Amend the Judgment Based 
on Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states six reasons for which a party may 
be relieved from judgment. While the first five reasons deal with specific circumstances and 
events, the sixth reason serves as a residuary clause, stating that a party may be relieved from 
judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 60(b)(6). Since defendants have not alleged any of the first five clauses of Rule 60(b), 
the court must assume that they intend to gain relief from the judgment based on the residuary 
clause of Rule 60(b)(6). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the residuary clause found in Rule 60(b)(6) 
"embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than those listed in subdivisions 
(1) through [(5)]; second, that the reason justify relief; and third, that the motion be made within 
a reasonable time." Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Ass 'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1307. 
Defendants clearly have complied with the first and third requirements established by the Utah 
Supreme Court. However, defendants have not complied with the second requirement because 
their Rule 60(b)(6) motion fails to state a reason that justifies relief Defendants' "sincere and 
compelling belief that plaintiff in fact did not use the lane in the manner asserted by plaintiffs 
witnesses and found by the Court" is insufficient to justify relief Instead, it appears that 
defendants are attempting to use Rule 60(b) as an appeal to the trial court from the court's own 
ruling and judgment. Defendants had their opportunity at trial to show that plaintiff did not use 
the lane in the manner asserted by plaintiffs witnesses, but failed satisfactorily to do so. After 
4 
both parties presented their case, Judge Pullan found in plaintiffs favor with regard to the 
prescriptive easement. Defendants simply have no reason which justifies amending or relieving 
them from the judgment. 
Conclusion 
I deny defendants' motion. Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
plaintiff s counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this f 7 day of November, 2006. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this ' u> day of November, 2006: 
Randy B. Birch 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
139 East South Temple Street, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kraig J. Powell 
Attorney for Defendants 
2 South Main Street, Suite 2-D 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
LOPJ WOFFINDEN 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
By Hi. A/i/l^'dilwU l/| 
Deputy Clerk 
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